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CHRISTOPHER HILL ON THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION: 
A SCEPTICAL DE-CODING OF SIGNIFICANCES. 
Conal Condren 
Christopher Hill is an eminent historian and hence I am pleased to provide a 
commentary on his paper concerning the significance of the English Revolution of the 
seventeenth century. My response is to the version of the paper I was given to read and 
which was then delivered at the workshop, although I understand that a similar version 
was given to a more a general audience earlier in 1987. I propose to approach the topic 
largely obliquely--complementing Hill's paper for the most part, rather than criticising it 
in detail. 
My reasons for this procedure are as follows. I take it that the idea of a workshop is 
to open up a range of issues. To devote time to the English Revolution invites above all 
else raising questions (however one tries to settle them) concerning its status as a 
revolution and the role in understanding that the predication 'revolution' might have. 
Hill's paper, perhaps because it was written with a different forum in mind, does not 
canvass such matters and I have difficulties in getting to grips with the way in which he 
does approach his subject matter. 
It seems to me that there is always a certain difficulty with any argument of the 
Cleopatra's nose type, which ponders whether events X or Y would finally have come 
about without event 'A' preceeding them. In any case, (though this may well be for lack 
of space) we are presented less with networks of complex events and circumstances 
than with the occasional happening which is taken to symbolise a series of highly 
rarified abstractions, a series of revolutions of indeterminate identity and rather long 
duration; and these in turn are attached to the barely discussed English Revolution. The 
status of this revolution as revolution is simply assumed and it is from this which 
comes, ultimately, the capitalist empire of 'top' nation England. It reminds me a little of 
1066 And All That which ends with a 'A Bad Thing', America's becoming 'top' nation 
and with history coming to a stop. 
Hill's paper is as noticeable for its simplicity of styles as it is for its innocence of 
generalisation. Yet it anticipates disagreement. Certainly some of the issues, on which 
Hill writes as if they needed no attention, require some direct comment, and as I am 
treating his paper indirectly, I trust that allusion to some of the earlier papers delivered 
at the present workshop, insofar as they illuminate the English Revolution topos, is 
permissible. 
Unless they have the good fortune to be working with self-evidently "precious 
happenings" in the ambit of political celebrations, many historians feel the need to 
assure a sceptical audience that their subject matter is important. As the tabloid press 
has a rich repertoire of semantic exclamation marks 'Vicar's tea party orgy shock horror 
drama' so the historian has an array of terms, that, although in some contexts useful 
enough (just as there are vicars who have tea parties), can become mere indiscriminate 
substitutes for the italic font, or the mega-letters of The Mirror. Crisis and 
Revolution are foremost among such terms. Sometimes, when combined, as David 
Christian has asked us to run them together to form a neo-Trotskyist revolutionary 
crisis epoch, it is like being asked to go to sea in a sieve. To be more fair (though I take 
it that is not part of my brief) words like revolution have shifted register from being 
descriptions to being, partly, and hence ambiguously, indicators of historiographical 
and political priorities. They indicate voice changes as does the use of terms such as 
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cause and idea. We call something a cause when a narrative ceases to seem self-
evident; we specify the ideas of a text when some meaning needs explicating; what we 
call the idea is thus a hypothetical completion or refashioning of the material word. It 
seems to me that more attention needs to be given, as David Marr did, to our most 
immediately palpable subject matter--the role of revolution in historiographical 
narrative and political commitment. Like Christopher Hill we are all apt to jump past 
this to look at the revolutions whose ontological status we take for granted (we call that 
'getting at the real issues'). It is a jump that is more justifiable for some case studies of 
revolution than for others. 
We can probably agree that the expression the "English Revolution"- found initially 
within the context of Whig historiography - was originally something of a semantic 
exclamation mark, a promotional device. It could also be suggested that the expression 
has nowadays become so standardised as to be a harmless token in the currency of 
historiography, a short-hand phrase which is quite acceptable because it need not pre-
empt too many interpretative options. I use the expression myself and need no 
persuading as to the interest and importance of the seventeenth century. However, 
among the interpretative options before us, there needs to be the possibility that no 
revolution in any modem sense of the word occurred then, and that whatever happened, 
Ireland and Scotland are as important as England in the matter. I mention Ireland and 
Scotland, because on occasion Hill does seem to conflate sixteenth-century England 
with Britain , which is to effect a geographical economy of scale that can most kindly 
be described as singular. Britain we were told needed no standing army because it was 
an island. But England was not an island and it is England for which Hill is providing 
an explanation. England shared a border with Scotland, a traditional enemy with very 
close links to France. 
Whether the English Revolution was a revolution in a modem sense is a more 
complex issue, and I will touch on it below. The most obvious way to reveal it as being 
so, however, is to predetermine any analysis of seventeenth century events by using the 
anachronistic nomenclature of post-French and Russian Revolutionary discourse (to lift 
a useful line from Alastair Maclachlan's paper). There was, after all, a very large 
change in the nomenclature of social and political analysis in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. This imposes a real barrier between us and the seventeenth 
century. Simply to impose our terminology of social relationships upon the seventeenth 
century is sleight of hand as it begs the question of whether there was a revolution. It is 
the way Milton was turned into a revolutionary yesterday by Michael Wilding's very 
interesting (but Hill-reliant) paper. We have here, in fact, a microcosm of the larger 
problem posited by Hill's paper. All this however, is hardly to touch on the full force of 
the expression the "English Revolution", or the full flavour of the literature generated 
around it. 
One might start then, with the obvious reflection (explored in different ways by 
Soumyen Mukherjee and Alastair MacLachlan), that societies without revolutions 
(safely tucked up in the past) or lacking clear-cut foundational mythologies, suffer a 
somewhat impoverished repertoire of political rhetoric in the present. Where would the 
French, the Vietnamese and Americans be without a recent, hardcore revolution, 
Australians and Canadians might ask with a soupc;;on of envy? Where are the Southern 
Cross decrepit prison, geriatric warders and seven inmates awaiting transfiguration? If 
the significance of history per se does not always lie in the political present, with the 
dead dog of the past having to be wagged by the tail of political enthusiasm and 
necessity, as John Ward seemed to suggest had to be the case, nevertheless the 
significances of revolutions do seem to lie in the political present. Further, calling 
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something a revolution is often enough part of a strategy of accommodating it to that 
present. Its analysis can then become ipso facto a means of fighting our own political 
battles by proxy, in a mandarin code. This is an unfortunately escapist confusion of 
distinguishable activities (politics and historiography), activities which involve 
differences of impulse and criteria of judgement, if not always differences of net result. 
Frequently enough the confusion culminates in a houdini-like avoidance of genuine 
political activity and historiography; and yet it is nevertheless a manifestation of that 
perpetual and unstable interplay between notions of past and present with which both 
historian and myth-monger operate. 
With respect to the English Revolution, the propensity to rely on and defend it as a 
genuine revolution is linked usually with models of explanation to which there is a very 
firm, perhaps even a prior, commitment; these models are contingently tied to 
understandings of twentieth century politics, and in turn are as much hortatory as 
explanatory. As a result, the attachment of the term revolution to, or its severance 
from, the period in question (stretching variably from around 1640) has a more than 
scholarly air, and some less than scholarly consequences. The whiff of hagiography 
and heresy is familiar enough to enyone who has worked at all in English seventeenth 
century history. There is a tolerable amount of pedigree polishing involved in the 
difficult enterprise of sifting through the detritus of the devious and diverse happenings 
of the revolutionary period. To abridge what one scholar has favourably said of Hill, 
his life's work, in one of its dimensions, has been a sort of "lest we forget" exercise on 
behalf of the prototypes of our own revolutionary age, a monument for the vanguard 
that was - the Levellers, the Baptists, Fifth Monarchy Men and the Ranters, all victims 
of the emerging bourgeois state. 1 The significance of the English Revolution lies for 
many where the Whigs would have put it: firmly in the present. And, as over the last 
generation or so the predication 'revolution' has been severely questioned from a 
number of directions and for varying mixtures of historiographical and political 
motivations, the possibility of the English Revolution being the Revolution that never 
was and was never conceived of, is a problem as much for political varieties of the 
present as for historical hypotheses about the past. Reaction against 'revisionism' (a 
dubious term nicely referred to by one historian as the liberal democratic alliance of 
British history) has begun to look as much a matter of threatened faith as historical 
understanding. This is what Hill's paper should have confronted. Instead, Hill 
postulates a very general causative sequence deriving from a phenomenon the identity 
of which is unexamined and unspecified, a sequence which is neither falsifiable nor 
verifiable, takes no explanatory risks and so must itself remain in the realms of faith. 
We are, after all, invited to contemplate the eighteenth century without the revolution 
preceeding it, as a means of showing everything to be 'indissolubly linked', a 
problematic akin to the choreographic condundrum about angels on the heads of pins. 
The problems surrounding the identity and significance of the English Revolution 
embrace the myriad personalities, the whole gamut of events, the opinions about events 
and the contemporary perceptions which may serve to explain the sustained conduct of 
those involved. I shall say a few words about each in turn, in order to convey 
something of the difficulties involved in ascertaining the Revolution's significance. 
When we talk about the English Revolution, are we referring to the two civil wars 
fought during the 1640's, to the Cromwellian regime that followed, or to the whole 
period between 1640-1660? Or, are we extending the term to refer to the whole period 
between 1640 and 1690? We have various options, but I do not think we can take them 
all up as Hill seems to by turns. For the most part he seems to refer to the Civil Wars 
and Interregnum, but in referring to the ideas of the Revolution, we are given the 
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Levellers, Newton and Locke. Anybody who is good gets in. One can think of 
plausible reasons for the broader identification not least because that so called 
revolution of 1688-89 was manifestly in the shadow of the events from 1640-49. Yet if 
that is so, what is the status of the intervening period of Stuart Restoration? Is that the 
real interregnum? Or is the whole period perhaps a revolutionary crisis epoch? If so, 
we can indeed be assured that without it, there would have been no eighteenth century, 
but what concepts can we employ to help discriminate within the revolutionary epoch 
itself? 
Revolution is a porous classifier and all revolutions seem matters of degree; we are 
rarely confronted with the sort of dramatic totality of transformation the word 
revolution might seem to suggest. The term, being variably applicable, leaves the way 
open, especially when submerged or nescient criteria are at work behind the loose talk, 
some of which can, in fact, be justified: as David Christian has indicated, loose 
concepts do play an important role in historiography. The scope and extent one assigns 
to the revolutionary identity then, has important consequences for explanation. The 
wider the chronological scope of the putative revolution, the more a diversity of 
possible causes can plausibly be put forward and the more, in the most trivial and 
indiscriminate sense, can a plethora of consequences be claimed. The narrower the 
scope of the Revolution, the more minor and personal causes seem adequate to explain 
'it' and the fewer, perhaps, its long term portentous consequences seem to be. We can 
thus shift from Stone's hypothesis of a crucial decline in the ruling aristocracy, to 
Russell's notion of the war being a sort of traffic accident. We can see it as being little 
more than a constitutional hiccup, as Lamont describes one contemporary's analysis of 
it;2 we can see it as 'indissolubly linked' (using Hill's ambiguous phrase) to Imperial 
Britain of the eighteenth century. This principal claim about indissoluble linkage does 
of course fudge the issue. On the one hand, the claim can be trivial; any two things can 
be linked with enough connectors of sufficient variety; historians are not dealing in any 
strict sense with factors, parameters or independent variables, despite the fantasies of 
cliometrics. On the other hand, 'indissolubly linked' can be an implausible bit of 
metaphysics, if we are expected to read that expression as referring to a causative chain. 
Apart from the logical difficulty of making sense of patterns of indirect causation, why 
start with The Revolution, why stop with Imperial Britain- remember Cleopatra's nose, 
think of Mrs Thatcher's hair- Thatcher and Scargill must fit into the picture somehow if 
a capitalist empire is a consequence of the revolution. 
With respect to the question of who was involved, or opposed to whom, we are 
familiar with the notion of an alliance between merchants and Puritans, and there is 
some truth in this. But in recent years the importance of an alliance has been 
questioned, and even the usefulness of such abstractions as 'Puritan' have had doubt cast 
upon them. The Civil War might partly be explained in terms of regional differences, 
north and west versus south and east, or in terms of the national projection of 
entrenched local differences - and with very large proportions of the community 
wanting to have nothing to do with it at all. To cast a further spanner in the engine's 
social causation, John Adamson's work (as yet largely unpublished) seems to be 
suggesting that the Revolution was initiated through an attempted coup by the old 
aristocracy, a body of men who managed to keep firmer hands on the parliamentary 
warhorse than we have traditionally thought.3 
If one turns briefly to perceptions of the issues involved and perceptions of what the 
'it' [England and the seventeenth century] was, revolution or something else, again we 
see something which only partially fits with the traditional sort of perception Hill 
intimates. Tax and money do not seem to have been the major issues, and I suspect 
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another sleight of hand, or an attempt to preempt explanatory possibilities by referring 
to people as taxpayers, as if it has to be in that capacity that they reacted against the 
monarch. Charles' personal government lasted for a remarkably long time. He raised 
money in ways that were not uniformly considered unconstitutional, or sufficiently so 
to justify rising up against him; this is impressive, given his apparent lack of 
bureaucracy. Even the ship money case, which was certainly a cause celebre did not 
stop Charles gathering his ship money with relative ease. Further, the town of 
Shrewsbury for example, in which there had been great hostility to ship money with 
consequent and considerable difficulty in its collection, proved staunchly loyal to the 
king throughout the war. It was Charles' religious policies which caused so much 
hostility and it was in terms of religion that opposition was organised and sustained, as 
Christopher Hill has I think come more and more to recognise. Ignorant of the alleged 
long term social causes of the revolution, contemporaries stressed with remarkable 
uniformity both the peace and good fortune of the realm before the outbreak of war and 
the issue of religion as vital in dividing people. This remains the case if one extends the 
revolution to include the dynastic change of 1688-89. The fear of Charles I's Romish 
fellow travelling and Arminian innovations (and, pace Michael Wilding, 'innovation' 
was not the seventeenth century equivalent of revolution) was played upon in the 
pamphlet literature of the 1688-9 revolution and the fear seemed to be justified in the 
religious policies of his sons. 
Common to the whole period was the inherited vocabulary of late medieval and 
reformation religious politics and it was through such a resilient inheritance that debate 
was organised. It is from the survival of such debate that we have to extrapolate what 
was going on. Too often, I have found, historians have been tempted to read past the 
debate to the no longer extant social reality (highly euphemistic expression), describing 
the latter in the nomenclature of their own ex post facto models of social explanation 
and political commitment. To repeat, this is to establish the appropriate credentials of 
the Revolution or its central figures such as Milton, by conceptual sleight of hand. As I 
have recently argued at some length, such a stacking of the conceptual cards occludes 
the very sense of self awareness the study of history is supposed to promote. Yet, if 
given sufficient attention, the inherited vocabulary and the conventions of its use give a 
less than revolutionary, in the sense of forward-looking, aspect to political argument 
and apparent perception, and seem to intimate something less than a revolutionary 
transformation. Not surprisingly, when people reflected on the cataclysmic 
disturbances of the 1640's symbolically encapsulated in the dramatic execution of 
Charles, they were apt to predicate the events less in terms of revolution (a word 
available but not very significant in any modern sense) and more in terms of a 
sacrilegious rebellion - a mundane analogue of God's local difficulties with Lucifer; or 
conversely, as a continuation of the reformation. 
In 1690 much the same political class continued to be in control as in 1640, using 
much the same range of intellectual materials. There was an expanding, remarkably 
literate, and interested population beyond the traditional confines of the political nation; 
but I think it arguable that the traditional ruling groups were perhaps only once 
seriously threatened from outside during the army discontents that briefly put the 
Levellers on the centre stage. On occasion, it was in the interests of the ruling groups 
to orchestrate a fear of intrusion for their own ends. 
This is not to say that the events of 1640-1660 were not of great moment. I do not 
believe the over-awing shadows of civil war mythologies have yet been sufficiently 
stressed or explored; but it could be misleading to call it all a revolution if that implies 
assimilation to later revolutions and explanatory models that might be appropriate to 
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them. If one is in search of an historically adequate explanation, the word revolution 
might simply be redundant. To settle such issues one needs to distinguish the 
predications 'revolution/revolutionary' as referring to descriptions of intended and 
executed action on the one hand, from being retrospective abridgements of significance 
on the other. Such distinctions should do something to help avoid confusion between 
Russia, China, France and Britain--assuming confusion is what we want to avoid. At 
the very least, I think one needs to distinguish between a revolution within a political 
culture and a revolution of a political culture. The first, I think, can surely be said of 
seventeenth-century England, and the rare contemporary usage of revolution would 
support such a view; but the second specification of revolution, of a political culture, is 
much more contentious and one cannot point to the evidence of the former to support 
the latter. This being said, are we nevertheless left with the choice between the non-
existent woods of Whig or Marxist mythology and the impenetrable infinities of the 
revisionist tree? Only a Queensland or Tasmanian logger would hope so. There are 
general historiographical categories distinct from political mythologies. The 
distinction, fluid though it is in practice, is panly a matter of the differing purposes that 
organising categories are made to serve, and by what standards one judges their use. 
There is certainly a good deal more involved than whether or not there is a political 
pany around to monitor one's work--the only difference David Marr suggested in his 
"history and Nonh Vietnamese propaganda". 
One alternative between the wood and trees is the hypothesis John Morrill is 
developing that the English Revolution was the last of the Reformation Wars of 
Religion. This incidentally seems a much more fruitful key to decoding Milton's 
political poetry and I agree with Michael Wilding, that such decoding needs to be done. 
To use such a key in preference to those provided by post French revolutionary social 
theory is not necessarily to ignore the importance of social groupings and economic 
change, but it is to look less anachronistically through the other end of the telescope at 
the confusions and revolutions of seventeenth-century Britain. The consequence, for 
good or ill, is to undermine the accommodating strategy of using the word revolution. 
This is not likely to be popular and we might prefer to rescue the coinage of revolution 
by its further debasement. If we make such a move and the currency, as John Ward 
showed, can easily enough be debased, we will be paying a significant historiographical 
price, for revolution can be a useful concept; but the political temptations are strong, for 
as I have suggested, the significance of the English Revolution qua revolution is in the 
twentieth century. 
Regardless of historiographical intention then, reviSionism has political 
consequences, and it would be naive of any historian, to think that some utopian 
synthesis of the extraordinary work of the last twenty years can easily be established or 
disentangled from what ultimately is more important for most people than the surviving 
evidence of the seventeenth century. 
The point can best be made with reference to the reception of a recent study on the 
Ranters. For a long time now we have been familiar with the Ranters as perhaps the 
most avant-garde group thrown up by the Revolution, expressive of its most libertine 
and perhaps liberating possibilities, the hostility towards them indicative of the forces 
of conservatism. In a word, they have become part of a lineage of liberation 
appropriate to twentieth century struggles. Colin Davis has recently published a short 
study which argues that they did not exist, that as any sort of cohesive group they were 
a fiction created by those who had need of such enemies. 
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Now there are discernibly historical matters at stake in the Ranter controversy, such 
as the evidential status of surviving attacks on the 'Ranters' [as also of the tracts 
associated with them], and the slipperiness of theological doctrines and their variable 
transformation into principles guiding specific action--issues of widespread importance. 
Equally, there are distinguishable historiographical problems involved. How far have 
historians such as Morton, Hill and McGreggor really portrayed the Ranters as a 
cohesive movement? How far is it legitimate to develop an abstract paradigm as a 
means of defining a class and then, as in Davis's case, using it to exclude all putative 
members from that class? What is really noticeable in the debate, however, is how all 
such matters have slid almost inexorably into contemporary political controversy and 
mutual accusations concerning the desertion of history for ideology--everyone seems to 
accept some difference between the two. For Thompson, Davis is anti-communist, an 
anti-historian of Thatcherite leanings; Davis replies with reference to Gulags. 4 
Outsiders might think that this is both unnecessary and distracting, something 
analogous to the way in which the debate between Hobbes and Wallis over squaring the 
circle ended with recriminations about being disloyal to Charles I. But as I hope I have 
made clear there is more to the matter than that and it is indissolubly linked to the very 
presence of an English Revolution in our political present, a point precisely captured by 
Jonathan Scott's reply to Thompson. What we see is historians sliding, if not inevitably 
down a value slope. to use an expression of Charles Taylor, at least into the arm chair 
politics so common amongst historians of the seventeenth century. It is less the 
offensiveness of some of Thompson's remarks that is striking here than the falling away 
of the mandarin idiom for direct reference to our own world. Hill has always been too 
much of a scholar and a gentleman to grace his historical criticism with epithets such as 
'Thatcherite', but the manifest merging of seventeenth century with twentieth century 
issues seems to me only the expected consequence of the sort of significance he and 
many more besides have traditionally built into the English Revolution. As I suggested, 
with the somewhat grand if arbitrary causative sequence Hill posits, there is little way 
of excluding Margaret Thatcher as one of the Revolution's significant consequences. 
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